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International lawyers have long accepted the need to respond to the challenges created by the 
Internet and other information and communications technologies. The primary focus, thus far, 
has been on the rules that apply to cyber warfare, specifically whether the laws of war can be 
stretched to the cyber domain. Increasingly, though, it is recognized that there is a need to be 
clear about the rules that apply to cyber operations falling below the use of force threshold, 
especially as few, if any, cyber operations have crossed that line, whilst malicious cyber 
operations below the use of force borderline are commonplace.  
 
This paper examines the legality of foreign state cyber operations targeting the practices of 
democracy, specifically attempts to ‘hack’ elections and change the result of the vote, and 
efforts to influence political campaigns through new social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.), 
including by the promulgation of ‘fake news’. The subject has become an issue of controversy 
following complaints that the Russian Federation interfered in the 2016 US presidential 
election, and there have also been allegations that Russia attempted to affect the 2017 French 
presidential election, the 2017 German general election, and as well as the 2016 UK Brexit 
referendum, and 2017 Catalan independence vote.  
 
Security analysists explain the alleged Russian behaviour in terms of a wider practice of hybrid 
warfare, sometimes referred to as information or political warfare, with the approach outlined 
by Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Russian military, in his now famous 
2013 article, in which he concluded that the ‘rules of war have changed… in the direction of 
the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military 
measures’.1 Hybrid warfare relies, inter alia, on the launching of cyber operations with the 
objective of changing the regime in the target state, or changing the way the Russian Federation 
is perceived in the target state, or undermining the population’s trust in the legitimacy of the 
target state’s democratic system.2 Thus, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
concluded that Russian cyber and propaganda operations during the 2016 US Presidential 
election were motivated by a desire to support the candidacy of Donald Trump over Hilary 
Clinton and to undermine the faith of the American public in the democratic process.3 
 
This work examines the issue from the perspective of the non-intervention principle. There are 
three reasons for this. First, the non-intervention principle is well established in international 
law, providing an irrefutable limit on the exercise of state power outside national borders. 
Second, there is no lex specialis applicable to state cyber operations, no agreed international 
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law of cyberspace, or Convention on the Law of Cyberspace. The rules that apply to cyber 
operations are the same ones that apply the other forms of interferences in the affairs of other 
states. Finally, those states that feel they have been subject to foreign state cyber operations 
targeting their democratic practices have framed the issue in these terms. In 2016, for example, 
the US State Department Legal Adviser, Brian Egan, argued that ‘a cyber operation by a State 
that interferes with another country’s ability to hold an election or that manipulates another 
country’s election results would be a clear violation of the rule of non-intervention.’4 In 2018, 
the UK’s Attorney General Jeremy Wright made the same point: the use of cyber power ‘to 
alter the results of an election in another state [...] must surely be a breach of the prohibition on 
intervention in the domestic affairs of states.’5  
 
To show that a cyber operation targeting one of the core practices of democracy is a violation 
of the non-intervention principle, we must be able to show that it is ‘coercive’ in nature, 
following the conclusion of the International Court of Justice in the 1986 Nicaragua (Merits) 
case that intervention is only wrongful ‘when it uses methods of coercion’. Hitherto, the 
literature on non-intervention has not examined in any detail the meaning of the term 
‘coercion’, with the consequence that conduct is presumed to violate the non-intervention 
principle without it being explained in what way the impugned activity is ‘coercive’. We see 
the problem in attempts to evaluate the legality of the so-called ‘DNC hack’ that occurred 
during the 2016 US presidential election, widely blamed on Russia, which resulted in private 
emails belonging to members of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the governing 
body of the Democratic Party, being released on WikiLeaks, confirming that the DNC favoured 
Hillary Clinton over Bernie Sanders, thereby damaging Clinton’s electoral prospects. Jens 
Ohlin makes the point that whilst this cyber operation ‘was certainly corrosive [to the proper 
functioning of American democracy], it is genuinely unclear whether it should count as 
coercive’, leaving ‘an overall impression of illegal conduct, but without a clear and 
unambiguous doctrinal route towards that conclusion.’6  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. It first outlines the non-intervention principle, before 
considering the putative problem of ‘cyber coercion’. Examining the meaning of ‘coercion’ in 
the customary non-intervention principle, the work explains that state activity is ‘coercive’ 
where the objective is to create a situation in which the target has no choice but to act as the 
outside power wishes (whether successful, or not), including through the use of cyber threats, 
the deployment of cyber power, or employment of cyber propaganda to undermine the system 
of political decision-making in the target state. The paper concludes by detailing the protection 
afforded to democratic states from state cyber operations targeting the core practices of 
democracy by the non-intervention principle.  
 
The Non-Intervention Principle 
 
The non-intervention principle first finds expression in Emer de Vattel’s, Law of Nations 
[1758], in which he concludes that ‘no foreign power has a right to interfere in’ ‘affairs being 
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solely a national concern’.7 The principle is explained as a logical and necessary consequence 
of the nature of sovereignty and the right of a political community to regulate its own affairs. 
Where disputes arise, Vattel is clear that ‘it belongs to the nation alone to judge and determine 
them conformably to its political constitution.’8 Vattel’s non-intervention principle is 
expressed succinctly: ‘[N]o state has the smallest right to interfere in the government of 
another.’9  
 
When the subject came before the International Court of Justice in the 1986 Nicaragua (Merits) 
case, the Court confirmed that the non-intervention principle, i.e. ‘the right of every sovereign 
State to conduct its affairs without outside interference’, is ‘part and parcel of customary 
international law.’10 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the divergence in state 
practice on the ground, and instead focused on the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, and 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, along with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The 
International Court of Justice determined that the non-intervention principle  
 
forbids all States… to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of 
other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in 
which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. … 
Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, 
which must remain free ones. The element of coercion… defines, and indeed forms the 
very essence of, prohibited intervention.11 
 
There are four elements to the non-intervention principle outlined by the International Court of 
Justice. First, this is an inter-state doctrine, which concerns the deliberate actions of one state 
targeting another state. Second, the interference in the internal or external affairs of the target 
state must concern an issue that a state should be permitted to decide freely. One of these is, 
the Court confirmed, is the choice of the political system, and the ICJ refused to ‘contemplate 
the creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by one State against another on 
the ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology or political system.’12 Third, 
intervention is wrongful ‘when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which 
must remain free ones.’ Finally, a coercive operation that interferes in the affairs of another 
state is a violation of customary international law where it cannot be justified as a lawful 
countermeasure.  
 
The Putative Problem of ‘Cyber Coercion’  
 
A state cyber operation with the objective of ‘hacking’ an election, so that the outside power’s 
preferred candidate was declared the winner, would be an interference in the internal political 
affairs of the target state, and it is difficult to see how such an action could be justified. The 
question then turns to whether the activity can be characterized as ‘coercive’, as required by 
                                               
7 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns [1797] (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), Book I, Ch III, para. 37. 
8 Ibid., Book I, Ch III, para. 36 (emphasis added). 
9 Ibid., Book II, Ch IV, para. 54. 
10 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para. 202. The International Court of Justice noted that the non-intervention 
principle ‘has moreover been presented as a corollary of the principle of the sovereign equality of States’: Id.  
11 Ibid., para. 205. 
12 Ibid., para. 263 
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the ICJ in the 1986 Nicaragua case. Where international lawyers have defined the term, and 
most writings on non-intervention do not, they have explained ‘coercion’ in terms of an 
unwilling conscious act. Thus, Christopher Joyner, in his entry on the subject in the Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International, defines coercion as ‘the government of 
one State compelling the government of another State to think or act in a certain way by 
applying various kinds of pressure, threats, intimidation or the use of force’.13 The problem is 
that cyber operations, specifically clandestine cyber operations, i.e. those not known to the 
target state, are not ‘coercive’ in the sense of changing the conscious behaviour of the target 
state. Thus, a remote cyber operation by State P that hacks the computer of the Election 
Commission in State Q, so that P’s preferred candidate is (wrongly) declared the winner (where 
Q is unaware of the operation), is not coercive on the standard understanding, because there is 
no attempt to change the conscious behaviour of the Election Commission.  
 
The problem created for the regulation of cyber operations by the element of coercion has led 
some writers to argue for a reformulation of the non-intervention principle to include the notion 
of ‘cybered coercion’, or for doing away with the coercion requirement altogether in the cyber 
context, or for the formulation of new international law rules. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, drafted by an international group of experts 
argues, for example, for the recognition of a new rule prohibiting the ‘interference with or 
usurpation of inherently governmental functions’,14 including ‘changing or deleting data such 
that it interferes with… the conduct of elections’.15 The commentary explains that the rule 
differs from the non-intervention principle because ‘intervention requires an element of 
coercion.’16 There are, though, two problems. First, there is limited evidence that a rule 
prohibiting the interference with, or usurpation of, inherently governmental functions exists as 
a matter of positive international law (the rule is deduced from sovereignty as a rule of 
international law); second, as we will see, a proper understanding of the word ‘coercion’ can 
capture certain clandestine cyber operations, including the hacking of election computers to 
change the result of a vote, and sustained cyber propaganda campaigns.  
 
The Meaning of ‘Coercion’ in the Non-Intervention Principle  
 
Whilst international lawyers are generally agreed on the methodology for the interpretation of 
written texts – looking to the approach outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, the rules for the interpretation of customary norms have not been subject to considered 
and sustained doctrinal examination. The key difference, of course, is that, in the case of 
custom, there is no text, we are concerned with the interpretation of, what Philip Allott calls, 
‘unwritten law’.17 There is, then, a requirement to translate custom into a form that allows for 
syllogistic and juridical reasoning, whereby the law-applier deduces the legality or validity of 
an act from the application of law to facts. We see this in the work of the International Court 
of Justice, where unwritten customary international law norms are translated into written form 
in order to reach a judgment on the rights and responsibilities of the parties in contentious 
                                               
13 Christopher C Joyner, ‘Coercion’ (2006) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 1 
(emphasis added).  
14 Michael N. Schmitt and NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), Rule 
4, Explanatory para. 10.  
15 Ibid., para. 16. 
16 Ibid., para. 22. 
17 Philip Allott, ‘Interpretation: An Exact Art’, in Andrea Bianchi, et al (eds), Interpretation in International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 373, 384 – 385. 
Wheatley: Regulating the Frontiers of Hybrid-Warfare 
`5 | P a g e  
 
cases. But the application of law to facts rarely allows for only one conclusion, and there is a 
need for the interpretation of law norms as one part of the process of juridical reasoning, that 
is of assigning meaning to legal norms, including customary international law norms. The 
question is how?  
 
There are essentially three possible approaches to the interpretation of law norms: (1) those 
that look to explain the ordinary or plain meaning of the words used; (2) systemic methods that 
try and make sense of the rule in its legal context; and (3) teleological arguments that look to 
explain the provision in light of its aim or objective. Famously, Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted a ‘general rule’ on interpretation that included all 
three approaches in the case of written international law. Albert Bleckmann concludes that the 
same general approach should be applied to the case of customary international law, with the 
meaning of customary norms emerging from what he calls (in translation) grammatical, 
systematic, and teleological methods of interpretation.18 The International Court of Justice has 
followed this approach, deploying methods of linguistic or grammatical interpretation, 
ensuring that an interpretation takes into account existing international law rules, and relying 
on the object and purpose of the rule to establish its content.  
 
To explain the meaning of the word ‘coercion’ in the non-intervention principle, then, we have 
to look, in the round, at (1) the ordinary way the term is used, especially its use in domestic 
law systems; (2) the way the term has been used in other areas of international law, to ensure 
consistency of usage; and (3) the object and purpose of the non-intervention principle. 
 
The ‘Ordinary’ Meaning(s) of Coercion  
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘coercion’ as the action of coercing, with ‘coercing’ 
defined as ‘the application of force to control the action of a voluntary agent.’ This can be done 
in one of three ways: coercion of the will, coercion of the body, and coercion of the mind. 
 
Coercion of the Will 
 
The meaning and proper understanding of the word ‘coercion’ has been subject to sustained 
analysis by legal and political philosophers. The best known and most influential account is 
the 1969 essay by Robert Nozick in which he concludes that coercion involves a threat by one 
actor (P) to another actor (Q) that if Q does not do (or does) a certain action (X), then deleterious 
consequences will follow for Q.19 The standard example is the threat by the gunman, ‘Your 
money, or your life’.  
 
Coercive threats result in a change (or maintenance) in the behaviour of others, that is P forces 
Q to ‘Do X’ through the threat of deleterious consequences if Q does not ‘Do X’. Q is a moral 
agent presented with an unpalatable choice, which is not, in any rational sense, a choice, 
although there remains, in the literal sense, a choice for Q, ‘Your money, or your life?’ A focus 
on coercive threats presupposes that the target acts consciously, albeit unwillingly; a situation 
which is distinguished from the use of force against the target. Peter Westen notes, for example, 
that we do not normally use the term coercion when we are acted upon. Thus, if P pushes Q 
                                               
18 Albert Bleckmann, ‘Zur Feststellung and Auslegung von Völkergewohnheitsrecht’ (1977) 37 ZaöeRV 504, 526 
– 528. 
19 Robert Nozick, ‘Coercion’, in Sidney Morgenbesser et al. (eds), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in 
honor of Ernest Nagel (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969) 440, 441 – 445.  
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into the swimming pool, we say that Q has been forced into the water, not that he has been 
coerced. To say a person has been coerced, ‘presupposes an act of will on his part.’20  
 
Coercion of the will involves, what the legal philosopher Grant Lamond calls, a forced choice, 
‘forced both because the choice situation is imposed by another, and because the situation is 
designed so that only one option will be regarded as acceptable.’21 We can, then, be made to 
do something through the creation of a choice situation in which only one course of action is a 
viable option.  
 
Coercion of the Body 
 
We can also be made to do something through the application of physical force. So instead of 
saying ‘Your money, or your life!’, the gunman can simply march you to the cashpoint, force 
your finger on your iPhone, and compel you to withdraw money from your account, without 
the need for you to make any conscious decision. In the case of physical compulsion, it is our 
bodies, rather than our minds, that are controlled by the other person, and, in contrast to moral 
coercion, where we rationally choose not to resist, ‘physical compulsion is [literally] 
irresistible’.22 It is the very success of physical coercion that makes it coercive.  
 
Force is coercive where P compels Q to ‘Do X’ in order to achieve some objective of P’s, and 
Q, in fact, ‘Does X’. Force is only coercive when P uses force to get Q to do something. Force 
cannot be characterised as coercive when P simply does something to Q. Thus, when P pushes 
Q into the swimming pool, P forces Q into the water; but when P grabs Q’s hand and makes 
her sign a document (where Q is physically incapable of resisting), then P coerces Q. That it, 
P achieves a certain objective by working through Q, treating Q, in the words of A. E. 
Farnsworth, as a ‘mere mechanical instrument’.23  
 
Coercion of the Mind 
 
In an early draft of what become Article 51 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Coercion of a Representative of a State), the International Law Commission’s Special 
Rapporteur, Gerald Fitzmaurice explained that ‘duress or coercion, whether physical or mental’ 
could include ‘certain modern methods of compulsion summed up by the term 
“brainwashing”’.24 He was writing immediately after the term was coined by Edward Hunter 
to explain the fact that American troops captured in the Korean War (1950-53) had returned 
from prisoner-of-war camps as apparently committed communists.  
 
Evan Stark explains that ‘brainwashing’, a form of psychological coercion, was understood to 
work through a process of breaking down the target’s sense of ‘self’ and their understanding 
of the world, and its replacement with ‘the controller’s altered picture of reality’. This was 
typically achieved through random acts of reward and punishment.25 Stark has successfully 
                                               
20 Peter Westen, ‘‘Freedom’ and ‘Coercion’: Virtue Words and Vice Words’ (1985) Duke Law Journal 541,565. 
21 Grant Lamond, ‘Coercion and the Nature of Law’ (2001) 7 Legal Theory 35, 40. 
22 Grant Lamond, ‘The Coerciveness of Law’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 39, 44.  
23 A. E. Farnsworth, Contracts (Boston: Aspen, 1982), p. 257. 
24 Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission: 1958, vol. II, p. 38, para. 58. 
25 Evan Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007) 359, reference to Edgar H. Schein, Coercive Persuasion: A Socio-psychological Analysis of the 
‘brainwashing’ of American Civilian Prisoners by the Chinese Communists (W.W. Norton, 1995). 
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argued that we can expand the notion of psychological coercion to include situation of 
‘coercive control’ in domestic violence situations, and that in all cases, ‘The victim’s agency 
is [the] principal target’ of the coercer.26  
 
Coercive control in intimate partner relationships has now been criminalized in a number of 
jurisdictions.27 In England and Wales, for example, Section 76(1) of the Serious Crime Act 
2015 establishes that, a person commits an offence if he repeatedly engages that is controlling 
or coercive, and the behaviour has a serious effect on the victim. The Government department 
responsible for the legislation has explained that ‘Controlling or coercive behaviour does not 
relate to a single incident, it is a purposeful pattern of behaviour which takes place over time 
in order for one individual to exert power, control or coercion over another.’28 
 
One form of psychological coercion to have entered the public imagination is that of 
‘gaslighting’, a term included in the Oxford English Dictionary in 2004, meaning: ‘The action 
or process of manipulating a person by psychological means into questioning his or her own 
sanity’. The expression, ‘gaslighting’, was taken from Patrick Hamilton’s 1938 play, Gas 
Light, later made into a film starring Ingrid Bergman, which tells the story of a man intent on 
convincing his wife she is insane, so he can steal her jewels. Kate Abramson makes the point 
that gaslighting, both in the film and in daily life, is a form of psychological manipulation in 
which the gaslighter attempts ‘to induce in someone the sense that her reactions, perceptions, 
memories and/or beliefs are not just mistaken, but utterly without grounds – paradigmatically, 
so unfounded as to qualify as crazy.29 The objective of the gaslighter is to gain control over the 
target, by removing the possibility of disagreement with an actor capable of moral agency, i.e. 
of deciding for herself, for her own reasons, so that when P suggests that Q ‘Does X’, Q is 
certain to ‘Do X’.30  
 
Psychological coercion, or coercion of the mind, describes a situation where there is a pattern 
of behaviour by P, with the objective that Q will behave in a certain way. P’s actions towards 
Q results in the destruction of Q’s capacity to make decisions for herself, and the information 
provided by P makes it inevitable that Q will act as directed by P. Q can appear to act on her 
own volition, but she is, in reality, destitute of freedom, because her capacity for meaningful 
agency has been destroyed by P.  
 
The Meaning of ‘Coercion’ in International Law  
 
In the ordinary meaning of the word, we can think of ‘coercion’ as involving two actors ‘P’ 
and ‘Q’, with a timeline of events. (1) P desires that Q ‘Do X’, but is concerned that Q will not, 
or might not, ‘Do X’; (2) P acts with the objective of ensuring that Q ‘Does X’; (3) P’s actions 
results in a denial of meaningful agency for Q, so that it is inevitably that Q will ‘Do X’; (4) Q 
‘Does X’. The standard example is when the Gunman (‘P’) says to his Victim (‘Q’), “Your 
money, or your life!” (‘Do X, or else!’). In this scenario, both P and Q are moral agents, i.e. 
actors with the capacity and will to decide things for themselves, for whatever reasons of their 
own. P intends that Q ‘Do X’ (here, give him the money), and he wants to be certain that this 
will happen. Rather than try to persuade Q, by providing a reasoned argument based on the 
                                               
26 Stark, ibid., 370. 
27 See also Section 39(1) Ireland Domestic Violence Act 2018; and Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018. 
28 Home Office, ‘Controlling or Coercive Behaviour in an Intimate or Family Relationship: Statutory Guidance 
Framework’, December 2015, para. 10. 
29 Kate Abramson, ‘Turning Up The Lights On Gaslighting’ (2014) 28 Ethics 1, 2. 
30 Ibid., 14-15 (emphasis in original). 
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facts, or offering incentives or disincentives, or by manipulating Q by providing false 
information, P acts to create a situation where it is inevitable that Q will ‘Do X’. Because of 
P’s actions, Q has no choice but to ‘Do X’ and Q’s moral agency, her right to decide for herself 
whether to give P the money, or not, has been negated.  
 
Where P does in fact ‘Do X’, we have all the elements of ‘coercion’. Where the efforts of the 
Gunman are not successful, we can still speak of ‘coercive behaviour’. To establish coercive 
behaviour we focus on the intentions and actions of P. Where a reasonably observer would 
conclude that the most likely explanation for P’s behaviour is that P intends to create a situation 
where Q must ‘Do X’, then we can describe that behaviour as ‘coercive’. Thus, when the 
Gunman says to his Victim, “Your money, or your life!”, that is coercive behaviour, whether 
or not the threat is effective.  
 




The same basic structure of coercion can be seen in its usage in international law. Article 51 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes, for example, that ‘The expression 
of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its 
representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal effect.’ 
The notion of ‘acts or threats directed against him personally’, is taken to include ‘not only a 
threat to his person, but a threat to ruin his career by exposing a private indiscretion, as also a 
threat to injure a member of the representative’s family with a view to coercing the 
representative.’31 Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach explain that coercion, in this context, 
includes acts or threats that ‘induce such fear [that the representative] feels compelled to 
express the represented State’s consent [when] she would not have done without such 
compulsion’32 (“Your consent to the treaty, or…”).33 
 
The notion of coercion is also found in Article 18 of the International Law Commission’s draft 
Articles on State Responsibility.34 Thus, where State P ‘coerces’ State Q into breaking its 
international law obligations owed to State Z, P will be responsible for Q’s actions. Coercion 
                                               
31 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), vol. II, p. 246[2]. 
32 Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: 
Springer, 2012), p. 862. 
33 Article 52 concerns the coercion of a state by the threat or use of force: ‘A treaty is void if its conclusion has 
been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations.’ 
34 ‘A State which coerces another State to commit an act is internationally responsible for that act’. 
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involves an action, in the words of the International Law Commission, ‘deliberately exercised 
in order to procure the breach of one State’s obligation to a third State.’ The commentaries 
explain the point in the following way: ‘Nothing less than conduct which forces the will of the 
coerced State will suffice, giving it no effective choice but to comply with the wishes of the 
coercing State.’35 The coercing state ‘is the prime mover in respect of the conduct and the 
coerced state is merely its instrument.’36  
 
‘Coercion’ in the Non-Intervention Principle  
 
In a lecture delivered at All Souls College, Oxford, in December 1860, Mountague Bernard, 
the inaugural Chichele Professor of International Law, explained that the existence of the non-
intervention principle reflected the fact that international law was founded on two cardinal 
principles: that ‘States are severally sovereign or independent’, and, at the same time, they are 
also ‘members of a community united by a social tie.’37 Here, Bernard captures the essential 
function of the non-intervention principle, which is to delimit the boundary between unfriendly 
interferences in the affairs of sovereign and independent states, and unlawful interventions.  
 
In the 1986 Nicaragua (Merits) case, the International Court of Justice explained that ‘The 
principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs 
without outside interference’.38 A prohibited intervention ‘must accordingly be one bearing on 
matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide 
freely.’39 Specifically, the Court concluded that adherence by a state ‘to any particular doctrine 
does not constitute a violation of customary international law; to hold otherwise would make 
nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty on which the whole of international 
law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political… system of a State.’40  
 
The right to freedom of political self-determination is not, though, exercised in a vacuum. In 
an inter-connected and inter-dependent world society, there is a requirement for co-operation 
and co-ordination between formally sovereign and independent states, a need reflected in the 
very existence of international law. Given that the actions of any one nation can affect any 
other, states will inevitably take an interest in the political situation in other countries, and may 
wish to influence the processes of political decision-making. The function of the non-
intervention principle is to delimit unfriendly interferences from unlawful interventions, and it 
does this with the inclusion of the criterion of ‘coercion’. States can offer advice or 
inducements to the populations or governments of other states, or try and influence the 
decision-making processes in some other way, but they cannot act with the objective of 
bringing about a certain outcome because this would amount to a denial of the right of the 
target state to freedom of political self-determination. Such actions would be ‘coercive’ in their 
very nature as we can see from a comparison between the ordinary meaning of ‘coercion’ and 
its function in the non-intervention principle, as explained by the International Court of Justice 
in the 1986 Nicaragua (Merits) case: 
  
                                               
35 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
with Commentaries, p. 69. 
36 Ibid., p. 65 (emphasis added). 
37 Mountague Bernard, On the Principle of Non-intervention (Oxford: J. H. & J. Parker, 1860), p. 7 
38 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para. 202. 
39 Ibid., para. 205. 
40 Ibid., para. 263. 
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The Ordinary Meaning of Coercion 
 
Coercion in Nicaragua (Merits) 
(1) P intends that Q ‘Do X’ 
Coercion not concerned with P doing something to Q 
(1) P intends that Q ‘Do X’  
Nicaragua complained that the US two objectives: (a) 
The overthrow of the government of Nicaragua; and 
(b) ‘to coerce the government of Nicaragua into the 
acceptance of United States policies’ (para. 239) 
(2) P takes some action to bring that about 
(coercion will, body, mind)  
 
The statement ‘P coerced Q into killing X’ can be 
understood in one of the following ways… 
 
(2) P takes some action to bring that about 
(coercion will, body, mind) 
 
State P coerces State Q by… 
(a) Coercive of the Will 
P threatened Q (‘Kill X, or else’) 
(a) Coercion of the will (moral coercion).  
‘the United States intended, by its support of the 
contras, to coerce the Government of Nicaragua in 
respect of matters in which each State is permitted…to 
decide freely’ (para. 241) 
 
(b) Coercion of the Body 
P pointed a gun at X, put Q’s finger on the trigger, and 
applied pressure to Q’s finger so that the gun fired, 
killing X 
 
(b) Coercion of the body (physical coercion).  
‘The element of coercion… is particularly obvious in 
the case of an intervention which uses force’ (para. 
205). 
(c) Coercion of the Mind 
P ‘brainwashed’ Q to kill X, which is the plot of The 
Manchurian Candidate (1962). 
 
(c) Coercion of the mind (propaganda). 
{See below} 
(3) Because of P’s actions  
There is a denial of Q’s capacity for moral agency, i.e., 
Q is not a willing participant in the act of killing X. 
 
(3) Because of P’s actions  
In all cases, there is a denial of State Q’s capacity for 
political self-determination. 
(4) Q ‘Does X’  
 
(4) Q ‘Does X’  
 
In both cases, where Q ‘Does X’, we have all the elements of coercion. The amount of pressure 
exerted by P is irrelevant. It is then a mistake to see the different between military force and 
coercion in the non-intervention principle as a matter of degree. The notion of coercion has a 
specific meaning in both the ordinary meaning of the word, and in international law. Coercion 
describes a situation where one moral agent intends that another moral agent act in a certain 
pre-determined way, and acts to bring this about by removing the target’s capacity to decide 
on the matter for themselves. But there is a difference between behaving coercively and the 
fact of coercion, in that coercive behaviour need not always result in the outcome desired by 
the coercing actor. Thus, where P intends that Q ‘Do X’ and takes some action to bring that 
about, we can describe that behaviour as ‘coercive’, whether or not it actually coerces the 
target.  
 
The point is significant, because in the 1986 Nicaragua (Merits) case, the International Court 
of Justice confirmed that there is a violation of the non-intervention principle where we see 
coercive behaviour: where ‘one State, with a view to the coercion of another state, supports 
and assists armed bands in that State whose purpose is to overthrow the government of that 
State, that amounts to an intervention’.41 There was no consideration in the judgment as to 
whether the US had been successful in overthrowing the government of Nicaragua. By 
supporting the contra forces, the US was ‘in breach of its obligation under customary 
                                               
41 Ibid., para. 241 (emphasis added). 
Wheatley: Regulating the Frontiers of Hybrid-Warfare 
`11 | P a g e  
 
international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State’.42 The same point can be made 
about US efforts to force the Nicaraguan government to change its policy positions. Again, 
there was no consideration as to whether the US had been successful, with the ICJ concluding: 
‘Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which 
must remain free ones.’43  
 
The non-intervention principle prohibits, then, (1) the deliberate and targeted actions of one 
state (‘P’) (2) aimed at interfering in the domestic political affairs of another state (‘Q’), where 
(3) the behaviour of P is ‘coercive’ in nature, and (4) the action cannot be justified as a lawful 
countermeasure, or on some other recognized ground under international law. Where State P’s 
actions are successful, and Q ‘Does X’, then Q has been coerced, and we have a factual 
situation of coercion. But if P is unsuccessful, if P’s action do not result in Q ‘Doing X’, then 
P’s behaviour is still coercive in nature. In other words, we look to P’s intention and actions to 
determine whether P’s behaviour is ‘coercive’. The relevant question is: “Has State P acted 
with the objective of putting State Q in a situation where they have no choice but to ‘Do X’?” 
Where this is the case, the behaviour is ‘coercive’, and, unless it can be justified, it will be an 
internationally wrongful act.  
 
Having established the meaning of ‘coercion’ and ‘coercive’ behaviour in the non-intervention 
principle, we can now turn to the legality of cyber operations targeting the core practices of 
democracy: (1) cyber operations hacking the election, in order to change the outcome of the 
vote; and (2) information operations undermining the capacity of the democratic polity to 
effective political self-determination.  
 
The Cyber Hacking of Elections 
 
Scott Shackelford and his colleagues identify a number of aspects of the electoral process that 
are potentially vulnerable to being hacked by way of modification of the software used in 
Election computers: (a) the electoral rolls used to verify voters’ eligibility might be hacked and 
names deleted, denying citizens the right to vote; (b) the electronic voting machines (where e-
voting is used) could be hacked to change the preferences of voters, or make votes ‘disappear’; 
and (c) the tabulation systems used to aggregate the results of an election to determine the 
winners might be hacked, and the outcome of the vote changed.44  
 
According to reports, democratic states are right to be concerned about the possibility of an 
election being hacked. In 1994, a hacker managed to add votes to the tallies of three right-wing 
parties in South Africa’s first democratic election, cutting into the lead of Nelson Mandela’s 
African National Congress party. The hack was discovered, but there was a delay as the 
counting method was switched from electronic to manual. In 2014, Ukraine’s presidential vote 
was targeted by cyber-attackers, who accessed the computer of the Central Election 
Commission and changed the result to show the winner was a far-right candidate. The Election 
Commission noticed the hack and managed to avoid naming the wrong winner, although 
Russian state-controlled media did broadcast the false result. In 2016, the website of Ghana’s 
Central Election Commission was hacked and false results announced from the Commission’s 
                                               
42 Ibid., para. 292 (3). 
43 Ibid., para. 205 (emphasis added). 
44 Scott Shackelford et al., ‘Making Democracy Harder to Hack’ (2017) 50 University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform 629, 636 – 638. 
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Twitter account while votes were still being counted. During the 2016 United States 
presidential election, there were attempts to hack voter rolls and change voter records. 
 
A cyber operation attributable to State P hacking the computer of the Election Commissioner 
in State Q, so that State P’s preferred candidate was (wrongly) declared the winner, would be 
an example of coercive cyber power. P’s objective is for Q to ‘declare P’s preferred candidate 
the winner’. Rather than offer inducements or warnings, a more or less generous aid package, 
for example, where there is no guarantee the population will vote for P’s preferred candidate, 
P uses its cyber power to ensure the Election Commission in Q ‘declare its preferred candidate 
the winner’, in circumstances in which State Q is unaware of the usurpation of its government 
functions.  
 
Cyber power is coercive where State P compels State Q to ‘Do X’, and Q ‘Does X’. It is the 
very success of the deployment of cyber power that makes it coercive. The scale of the cyber 
operation is irrelevant. It follows that any cyber operation, including the insertion of a few bits 
of data into a software programme, which achieves P’s objective of having its preferred 
candidate declared the winner, would, by definition, be coercive. The cyber operation contains 
all the elements of coercion: (1) P’s objective is for Q to ‘do X’ (‘declare its preferred candidate 
the winner); (2) P achieves this objective by working through the government institutions in Q 
(the Electoral Commission); and (3) there is no possibility of Q resisting (because Q is unaware 
of the hack), meaning there is a denial of meaningful freedom of action. 
 
Likewise, a failed cyber operation with the objective of changing the results of an election 
would be a violation of the non-intervention principle – where, for example, the cyber defences 
of the target state are sufficiently robust to repel the attack. The International Court of Justice 
was clear in the 1986 Nicaragua case that there is a violation of the non-intervention principle 
where a state seeks to interfere in the domestic political affairs of another state, and its actions 
can be described as ‘coercive’. Behaviour is coercive where one state acts to get the target state 
to ‘Do X’, including through the deployment of physical force, and the target has no option but 
to ‘Do X’. In the case of hacking an election, the objective is to change the vote so that P’s 
preferred candidate is (wrongly) declared the winner. If the hack is successful this will happen: 
P’s preferred candidate will be declared the winner and there will be nothing that Q can do 
about the situation. Consequently, an attempt to hack an election is, by definition, coercive, 
because the objective is to get Q’s computer to ‘Do X’, leaving the Electoral Commission in Q 
with no choice but to comply.  
 
Cyber Information Campaigns  
 
We have seen that the notion of ‘coercion’ can be applied to the deployment of coercive threats 
in international relations and to the use of coercive force. These are direct forms of coercion, 
whereby State P looks to affect the constitutional system in State Q with the objective of 
changing (or maintaining) the government or changing (or maintaining) some aspect of 
government policy. Propaganda works differently, in that P aims to bring indirect pressure on 
Q by influencing or manipulating the population in Q in a certain predefined way, with the 
population then directly influencing the constitutional system of political decision-making.  
 
In the 1986 Nicaragua (Merits) case, the Court confirmed that the non-intervention principle 
concerned ‘the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside 
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interference’.45 But what amounts to an ‘interference’ in the political affairs of another state, 
and what constitutes an unlawful intervention? The following section explain the long-standing 
prohibition on subversive interventions before considering the problem of ‘fake news’, and 




One of the notable points about alleged Russian cyber operations is that they are not considered 
to be aimed at supporting a particular ideology, in contrast, for example, to the situation in the 
Cold War (1947–91), when the Soviet Union would assist communist and other left-wing 
political parties, and the United States supported right wing parties. Russian interference today 
is seen as destructive by Western states, with, for example, the US Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence concluding that Russian cyber and propaganda operations during the 
2016 presentation election were, in part, motivated by a desire to undermine the faith of the 
American public in the democratic process,46 and the British Prime Minister, Theresa May 
complaining that Russia is ‘seeking to weaponise information. Deploying its state-run media 
organisations to plant fake stories and photo-shopped images in an attempt to sow discord in 
the West and undermine our institutions.’47 
 
Efforts to undermine the trust of the population in the government (elected or otherwise) with 
the objective of changing the system of government are characterized in international law as 
‘subversive interventions’. The illegality of subversive intervention is well established in 
international law doctrine and practice, with Emer de Vattel declaring in 1758 that ‘It is a 
violation of the law of nations to invite those subjects to revolt who actually pay obedience to 
their sovereign, though they complain of his government’.48 Two recent inclusions in the Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law make the same point. Eric de Brabandere 
concludes that the prohibition on subversive propaganda is ‘a deep-rooted principle 
of customary international law’;49 Philip Kunig concurs: Subversive interventions ‘are 
prohibited, if they aim to foment revolt or civil strife in another State’.50  
 
A subversive intervention is an interference in the domestic political affairs of the target state 
with the objective of introducing a new constitutional system of government, often more 
sympathetic to the intervening power. Quincy Wright concurs with the illegality of subversive 
interventions, including by way of propaganda ‘with the intent or likelihood of inciting sedition 
or revolt against the governments of other states’,51 but concludes that mere criticism of the 
policy of a state is ‘in a different category, and [is], of course, permissible.’52 Others take a 
different view, with, for example, Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood concluding that 
                                               
45 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para. 202. 
46 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US 
Elections’, 6 January 2017, p. ii.  
47 PM speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 13 November 2017. Available 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-to-the-lord-mayors-banquet-2017>, accessed 30 April 
2018.  
48 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs 
of Nations and Sovereigns [1797] (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), Book II, Ch IV, para. 56.  
49 Eric de Brabandere, ‘Propaganda’ (2012) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 11. 
50 Philip Kunig, ‘Intervention, Prohibition of’ (2008) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 
24. 
51 Quincy Wright, ‘Subversive Intervention’ (1960) 54 American Journal of International Law 521, 523. 
52 Ibid., 532. 
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political interference covers any situation ‘where one state becomes involved in the internal 
political processes of another’, and is, in principle, prohibited under international law.53  
 
What, then, would we make of US President Barack Obama’s plea to the British public to vote 
against Brexit, and warning that the UK would be at the ‘back of the queue’ in any trade deal 
with the US, if the country chose to leave the European Union?54 There is no doubt this was an 
interference in UK domestic politics. The Oxford English Dictionary explains the meaning of 
‘interference’ in terms of the action of interfering or intermeddling, with intermeddling defined 
as ‘to concern oneself with what is none of one’s business’. Given that the object and purpose 
of the non-intervention principle is to protect the right of political self-determination, with the 
element of coercion having the function of delimiting unfriendly interferences from unlawful 
interventions, we can understand ‘interference’ in the normal sense of any action that looks to 
intermeddle in the internal political affairs of another state, including any comment aimed at 
the domestic population concerning a matter of political controversy. The key question remains 




The term ‘fake news’ came to prominence during the 2016 US presidential election, including 
the claim that Pope Francis had endorsed Donald Trump prior to the election, and it was named 
‘word’ of the year in 2017. Fake news mimics traditional news media, but lacks its commitment 
to accuracy and credibility, and studies show that people often struggle to distinguish fact from 
fiction on the Internet and in social media. 
 
There is widespread agreement that factual information produced by a state intended to inform 
the citizens of another state, including information about the actions of their own government, 
does not constitute a violation of the non-intervention principle. It follows, as Thomas and 
Thomas point out, that news broadcasts do not fall within the definition of propaganda, ‘for 
news broadcasts are the transmission of facts.’55  
 
‘Fake news’ does not, self-evidently, enjoy the exemption applied to factual information under 
the non-interference rule. To consider the position of ‘fake news’, consider the following 
(hypothetical) example:56  
 
The objective of State P is to see the removal of President Jones in forthcoming 
elections in State Q. President Jones is a social conservative and in order to reduce his 
support amongst the electorate, the intelligence agency in P creates, and then releases 
on the Internet, a video that appears to show, in convincing detail, President Jones 
engaged in unlawful sexual acts.  
 
                                               
53 Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, ‘The Principle of Non-intervention’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of 
International Law	345, 368. 
54 Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason, ‘Barack Obama: Brexit would put UK ‘back of the queue’ for trade 
talks’, The Guardian 22 April 2016.  
55 Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas 
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956), p. 290. 
56 Albeit not so far from reality, given creation and release of a ‘Hillary Clinton hotel sex tape’ by Russia’s Internet 
Research Agency: Ben Collins, ‘Russia-linked account pushed fake Hillary Clinton sex video’, NBC News 11 
April 2018 <https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/russia-linked-account-pushed-fake-hillary-clinton-sex-
video-n864871> (Last visited 27 February 2019.) 
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The video is false, this is ‘fake news’. The objective of P in our scenario is to affect the outcome 
of the election in Q. Rather than rely on reasoned argument, or offer incentives or disincentives 
to the population, so that the population in Q can make a decision based on the facts, and a 
correct understanding of the facts, P decides to try and manipulate the electorate by way of the 
publication of a falsehood, with the aim of persuading the population not to vote for President 
Jones.  
 
The publication of the video is an example of propaganda, defined by Eric de Brabandere as a 
method of communication ‘aimed at influencing and manipulating the behaviour of people in 
a certain predefined way. The element of influence and manipulation is at the centre of the 
concept, and distinguishes it from mere factual information.’57 ‘Manipulation’ is defined by 
the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘the exercise of subtle, underhand, or devious influence or 
control’. But there is a difference between manipulation and coercion. ‘Manipulation, by 
definition, influences decision-making’,58 albeit it an immoral fashion, but it does not 
predetermine the outcome of the decision-making, as the target retains the ability to make her 
own decision, albeit on the basis of false information. Thus, where, through the production of 
‘fake news’, a state looks to influence the population of the target state, this does not constitute 
coercive behaviour because the interfering state has not acted to create a situation where it is 
inevitable that the target population will ‘Do X’. The production of fake news is not, then, 
intrinsically coercive, and does not, of itself, constitute a violation of the non-intervention 
principle. 
 
Cyber Propaganda  
 
In his major study on The International Law of Propaganda, first published in 1968, 
Bhagevatula Satyanarayana Murty explained that propaganda is coercive when it exerts ‘high 
psychological pressure on the audience to adopt a particular attitude or behaviour’.59 Whereas 
attempts at persuasion leave the individual with a number of alternatives, coercion subjects the 
target ‘to a high degree of constraint in the choice of alternatives’.60  
 
Before the Internet, it was almost impossible for an outside power to control the information 
environment in another state, and that remains the position today. In an open, democratic, 
society, citizens can gain knowledge from a variety of sources, including a plurality of voices 
from inside and outside the country. In a closed, authoritarian state, it is difficult to imagine an 
outside power supplanting the propaganda efforts of the domestic government. However, as 
more people get their news and commentaries on politics from sources such as Facebook and 
Twitter, it becomes more difficult for democratic governments to control the information 
available to citizens, and the possibility increases of a foreign power creating an information 
environment in which a single political narrative predominates, and citizens see themselves as 
having only one (rational) choice. 
 
One of the complaints by the United States following the 2016 presidential election was that 
the Russian Federation’s ‘state-run propaganda machine’ had conducted an ‘influence 
campaign’ which sought to sway the election, including by making favourable comments about 
                                               
57 Eric de Brabandere, ‘Propaganda’ (2012) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 1. 
58 See Robert Noggle, ‘The Ethics of Manipulation’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), para. 3.3 (emphasis added). 
59 B.S. Murty, The International Law of Propaganda: The Ideological Instrument and World Public Order (New 
Haven: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. lxvii.  
60 Ibid., p. 28. 
Wheatley: Regulating the Frontiers of Hybrid-Warfare 
`16 | P a g e  
 
Donald Trump, while consistently offering negative coverage of Hilary Clinton. The scale of 
the alleged activity is noteworthy, with the New York Times reporting that Russian agents were 
responsible for posts on Facebook that reached 126 million US citizens, with the content 
focusing on divisive issues in American politics, such as race, religion, gun rights, and gay and 
transgender issues.61  
 
Cyber propaganda constitutes an interference in domestic political affairs where State P 
publishes non-factual material on the Internet, which can be accessed by the citizens in State 
Q, with the objective of influencing the citizens in Q to change the government, or call for a 
change in government policy. Under the non-intervention principle, state propaganda is an 
internationally wrongful act when it can be characterized as ‘coercive’.  
 
We have seen that the ordinary meaning of the word ‘coercion’, as understood in domestic law 
systems, has expanded to include psychological coercion, a situation in which P seeks to 
control the actions of Q by undermining Q’s capacity to decide things for herself, for her own 
reasons. Rather than try and persuade Q through reasoned argument, or manipulate the situation 
in order to influence the outcome, P aims to ensure that a certain decision will be reached by 
undermining Q’s capacity for moral agency. Moral agency, or meaningful self-determination, 
depends on two factors: (1) the ability of an actor to decide things for herself, and relatedly to 
see herself as a deliberative agent; and (2) the possession of relevant information in order to 
make a decision. Psychological coercion subverts one or more of these elements, undermining 
the target’s capacity for meaningful agency, and creating an information environment that 
suggests there is only one sensible choice.  
 
The notion of ‘gaslighting’ as one manifestation of psychological coercion is concerned with 
the undermining of the target’s capacity to decide things for herself, for her own reasons. 
Gaslighting is coercive because P intends to exercise control over Q, so that Q does as P wishes 
(i.e. Q ‘Does X’). P acts to bring this about by undermining Q’s sense of self over time, so that 
Q will doubt her own sanity. Where P is successful, and Q does directed by P, then, we have 
all the elements of coercion.  
 
Increasingly, the term ‘gaslighting’ is applied to Russia’s information warfare operations, 
specifically its reflexive control techniques.62 Han Bouwmeester, for example, describes 
Russian activity in terms of ‘creating a pattern or providing partial information that causes an 
opponent to react in a predetermined fashion without realizing that he is being manipulated[;] 
all is mixed up, and at the end the opponent cannot see the wood for the trees.’63 Giles Keir 
and his colleagues argue that Russia is seeking to influence decision-making in other states by 
supplying ‘polluted’ information to the public, often on social media, in order to influence the 
population to adopt a particular policy position and undermine the capacity of the state to 
engage in meaningful and effective political self-determination.64 
 
                                               
61 Mike Isaac and Daisuke Wakabayashi, ‘Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through Facebook Alone’, 
New York Times, 30 October 2017. 
62 See, for example, Brandon Valeriano et al., ‘5 things we can learn from the Russian hacking scandal’, 
Washington Post, January 9, 2017. 
63 Han Bouwmeester, ‘Lo and Behold: Let the Truth Be Told: — Russian Deception Warfare in Crimea and 
Ukraine and the Return of ‘‘Maskirovka’ and ‘Reflexive Control Theory’, in P.A.L. Ducheine and F.P.B. Osinga 
(eds.), Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017 (Berlin: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017) 125, 140. 
64 Giles Keir, et al., ‘Russian Reflexive Control’ (Kingston, On: Royal Military College of Canada, 2018), p. 8. 
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Cyber propaganda, in the form of disinformation and fake news, is an international wrongful 
act under the non-intervention principle where a reasonable person would conclude that there 
is evidence of a sustained information campaign with the objective of denuding the capacity of 
the target state for effective political self-determination, where, for example, cyber propaganda 
‘pollutes’ the democratic debate in the target state to such an extent that it undermines the 
capacity of the population to make a meaningful choice based on the facts, and a proper 
understanding of the facts.  
 
Where a reasonable person would conclude, based on the evidence, that the objective of the 
outside state is to undermine the democratic process by mixing up truths with falsehoods and 
creating an information environment with the objective that the population reach a position 
predetermined by the outside power, then, such a cyber campaign is coercive in nature, and, as 
a consequence, is an internationally wrongful act. The success, or otherwise of the propaganda 
campaign is irrelevant. The prohibition in on ‘coercive’ behaviour (1986 Nicaragua (Merits) 
case), that is on cyber propaganda operations undertaken with the objecting of producing a 




Not all uses of cyber power by states against other states are unlawful under international law. 
States are free to carry out cyber operations, providing there is not a rule of international law 
prohibiting the relevant activity. The deployment of cyber power is unlawful under the non-
intervention principle where the objective is to (a) change (or maintain) the existing 
government in the target state, (b) change (or maintain) a particular government policy, or (c) 
change (or maintain) the political opinions of the population – and the activity can be 
categorized as coercive (and it cannot be justified). 
 
There is no doubt that any attempt by a state to involve itself in the domestic political affairs 
of another state constitutes an interference in its internal affairs. The line between unfriendly 
interferences and unlawful interventions is, as we have seen, provided by the criterion of 
‘coercion’ in the non-intervention principle. The ordinary and juridical meanings of the term 
both describe a situation whereby one actor (‘P’) intends that another actor (‘Q’) do something 
(or refrain from doing something), i.e. that they ‘Do X’ (or not ‘Do X’), and P wants to be 
certain that this will happen. P then acts to ensure that Q ‘Does X’, either through the use of 
coercive threats (coercion of the will), or the deployment of coercive force (coercion of the 
body), or psychological coercion (coercion of the mind). Because of P’s actions, Q has no 
choice but to ‘Do X’, and there is consequently a denial of Q’s moral agency, or capacity for 
self-determination. Where Q ‘Does X’, we have all the elements of coercion. But where Q does 
not ‘Do X’, P’s behaviour can still be categorized as ‘coercive’ where a reasonable observer 
would conclude that P’s actions were undertaken with the objective of putting Q in a situation 
where she had no choice but to ‘Do X’.  
 
Cyber power is coercive where State P compels State Q to ‘do X’ in order to achieve some 
objective of P’s, and Q ‘Does X’. Applying this understanding to foreign state interferences in 
democracy, we can see that the hacking of elections would be an example of coercion. P is 
deploying its cyber power in order to get Q to ‘Do X’. Where this is successful and Q ‘Does 
X’, we have all the elements of coercion. There is an absolute prohibition on states using cyber 
power to change the outcome of an election in another state, by, for example, hacking the 
electoral roll to remove voters that have traditionally supported one party; hacking voting 
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machines to change voters’ preferences or make votes disappear; and hacking the computers 
used to aggregate the results of the election to determine the winners. The key point is that 
State P works through the government institutions in State Q to realize its objective in such a 
way that the Election Commission in a mere mechanical instrument in State P achieving its 
objective. Where P is not successful (perhaps because State Q has robust cyber defences), P’s 
actions can still be described as ‘coercive’, because P’s objective is to get Q to ‘Do X’, and, if 
the hack were successful, Q would have had no choice but to ‘Do X’.  
 
The position in relation to information operations is more complicated. There is a long-standing 
prohibition in international law on subversive interventions, that is explicit calls on the 
population to reject the system of government. Emer de Vattel explains the point succinctly: 
‘It is a violation of the law of nations to invite those subjects to revolt who actually pay 
obedience to their sovereign’. It is the very fact of calling for revolution in another state which 
is wrongful, its success or failure is irrelevant. The prohibition on subversive interventions does 
not, however, prevent an outside power from seeking to influence the outcome of the existing 
constitutional process (a subversive intervention is concerned with the destruction or 
replacement of the constitutional system).  
 
There are two relevant issues when considering the legality of state propaganda under the non-
intervention principle, including cyber operations: (1) is the information true; and (2) if it is 
not true, can it be characterized as ‘coercive’? There is widespread acceptance that the 
interdiction against one state interfering in the domestic political affairs of another state does 
not apply to factual information. The converse is not the case, however: ‘fake news’ is not, ipso 
jure, prohibited under the non-intervention principle. Fake news, that is information that 
mimics the traditional news media, but lacks its commitment to accuracy, is manipulative; it is 
not coercive, and the line between unfriendly interferences in the political affairs of democratic 
states and unlawful interventions is provided by the element of ‘coercion’. 
 
Propaganda is a form of psychological coercion, which works by undermining the capacity of 
the target to decide things for herself, for her own reasons; and/or creating an information 
environment in which the target sees herself as having only one choice (i.e. to ‘Do X’). The 
target can appear to be acting freely, but in reality her capacity for meaningful self-
determination has been destroyed, in order that she does as directed by the coercing power.  
 
Propaganda works by mixing up truth and lies, fact and fiction, undermining the capacity of 
the target population for meaningful political self-determination. When accompanied by an 
overwhelming information campaign whereby a single narrative dominates the political 
discourse, State P can bring about a situation whereby the population in State Q has no choice 
but to ‘Do X’ (elect P’s preferred candidate as President). Where an outside power intends to 
determine the outcome of the political processes of another state, and acts on that intention, 
that behaviour is ‘coercive’ in nature. Thus, where a reasonable observer would conclude that 
the objective of a foreign state cyber operation, undertaken over a period of time, was to 
undermine the capacity of the target population for meaningful political participation through 
the promulgation of fake news and the development of a single political narrative, that 
behaviour would be coercive, and, consequently, an internationally wrongful act, allowing the 
target state to introduce counter-measures to force the outside power to cease its offensive 
cyber operation.  
